Are Cooperatives Hybrid Organizations? An Alternative Viewpoint by Valentinov, Vladislav & Fritzsch, Jana
Are Cooperatives Hybrid Organizations?
An Alternative Viewpoint
by
Vladislav Valentinov and Jana Fritzsch*
Abstract
This paper questions the designation of cooperatives as hybrids of market 
and hierarchy on the grounds that cooperatives possess more differences 
from these governance mechanisms than commonalities with them. It is 
argued that the definition of a governance mechanism’s hybridity depends 
on the definition of the governance continuum, with the conventional 
market-hierarchy continuum failing to accommodate the specificity of the 
cooperative organization. Utilizing the logic of the property rights theory of 
the firm, the paper develops an alternative continuum for cooperative, 
hierarchical, and market organization. These governance mechanisms are 
shown to exhibit growing difference in the extensiveness of property rights 
assigned to the involved contractual parties. This continuum does not imply 
the hybridity of cooperatives; rather, it locates hierarchy between market and 
cooperative organization. The empirical validity of the new continuum is 
confirmed by the results of a survey of members of several Ukrainian rural 
cooperatives. 
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Introduction
In his seminal article on the nature of the firm, Ronald Coase emphasized in 1937 
that business activities can be governed by different organizational arrangements 
whose economic role consists of economizing on transaction cost. Coase’s insights 
have led economists to recognize that the basic economic institutions of market 
economies are markets and hierarchies, which are primarily defined by their 
reliance on the price mechanism and authority relation, respectively (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1985). In recent decades, however, economic research has been 
increasingly focused on a diverse set of organizational arrangements that can be 
characterized as hybrids between market and hierarchy (Menard, 2004). 
Cooperatives have also been traditionally believed to belong to this set, for two 
interrelated reasons. First, they are distinctly different from both markets and 
hierarchies. Second, recognizing markets and hierarchies as opposite modes of the 
governance   continuum   necessarily   requires   categorizing   every   governance 
mechanism other than market and hierarchy as a hybrid between the two. The 
former reason is fairly self-evident. The latter, however, is much less satisfactory 
in that it defines hybridity as merely being different from market and hierarchy. 
Apart   from   its   sheer   semantic   inadequacy,   this   definition   downplays   the 
significance of exploring what hybrid governance mechanisms genuinely have in 
common with market and hierarchy. The danger involved in this definition is that 
some governance mechanisms may have so little in common with market and 
hierarchy that they are more appropriately categorized as ‘independent’ rather than 
‘hybrid’. This categorizing, in turn, would require re-defining the standard market-
hierarchy continuum, which is based on two, rather than three, independent 
governance mechanisms. 
It is this difficulty that plagues the designation of the cooperative organization 
as being hybrid. Indeed, the two major studies that addressed the issue of hybridity 
of cooperative organization remained vague on the precise nature of those 
characteristics that cooperatives share with market and hierarchy (Menard, 2004; 
Bonus, 1986). In particular, Bonus (1986) defined the hybridity of cooperatives 
through their combining the benefits of independent and collective organization. 
While well wrought in its own right, this argument sheds no light on the issue of 
similarity between cooperatives, on the one hand, and market and hierarchy on the 
other. Nor is this issue clarified by identifying hybrids’ fundamental regularities, 
such as resource pooling, contracting, and competing (Menard, 2004), despite the 
indisputable intrinsic value of knowing these regularities. 
At the same time, a closer look at the way the relationships among cooperative 
members   are   organized   reveals   substantial   differences   between   cooperative 
organization and market and hierarchy. Crucially, inter-member relationships 
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within a cooperative do not involve buying from and selling to each other, nor do 
they involve the subordination of some members to others. Rather, cooperative 
organization is an embodiment of collective action aimed at realizing the common 
interests of cooperative members. As collective action, cooperation cannot be 
characterized as a seller-buyer interaction in the market and as an employer-
employee interaction in a for-profit firm (even not very hierarchical one). The 
relationships among cooperative members are thus inconsistent with the use of 
both price mechanism and authority relation, underlying, respectively, market and 
hierarchical   organization   (Valentinov,   2005).   Given   this   inconsistency,   it   is 
inappropriate   to   designate   cooperatives   as   hybrids.   Rather,   they   must   be 
understood as representing an independent governance mechanism which has its 
own distinct identity that is not reducible to a combination of identities of market 
and hierarchy. 
However, recognizing cooperation as an independent governance mechanism 
raises the issue of defining the logical relationship between cooperatives, markets, 
and hierarchies; that is, extending the traditional market-hierarchy continuum to 
make it accommodate the distinct identity of cooperative organization. Generally, 
the task of defining a governance continuum boils down to the task of identifying 
criteria with respect to which different governance mechanisms exhibit systematic 
variation.   Criteria   underlying   the   traditional   market-hierarchy   continuum,   in 
Williamson’s (1991) treatment, include, among others, incentive intensity and 
degree of reliance on administrative controls. Yet while these criteria permit a 
clear-cut contrast between market and hierarchy, they are not very helpful in 
clarifying the logical position of cooperative organization with respect to these 
governance   mechanisms.   Consequently,   re-defining   the   market-hierarchy 
continuum so as to include cooperative organization must be based on other criteria 
yet to be identified. 
Accordingly,   this   paper   will   consider   the   possibility   of   constructing   a 
governance   continuum   that  explicitly  includes   the   three  distinct   governance 
mechanisms of market, hierarchy, and cooperative organization. The added value 
of this continuum lies in clarifying the logical relationship of cooperatives to 
markets and hierarchies, and thus filling the conceptual gap created by rejecting the 
designation of cooperatives as hybrids. Crucially, the continuum must yield 
economic rationale for the fact that cooperatives embody the collective action of 
their members, while markets and hierarchies cannot be characterized in these 
terms. The paper’s approach to constructing this continuum will be to build upon 
the property rights theory of the firm, which has aimed to reveal the rationale 
behind the property rights structure underlying hierarchical organization in terms 
of the efficiency of assigning to some contractual parties more extensive property 
rights than to others (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 
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1995). This explanatory framework will be extended to account for market and 
cooperative organization, thus enabling a continuum representation of all involved 
governance mechanisms. 
The paper will proceed as follows. The next section will summarize the 
manner in which the property rights theory of the firm explains hierarchical 
organization. In subsequent sections, this explanation will be extended to fit the 
cases of market and cooperative organization, thus resulting in an alternative 
continuum view of these governance mechanisms. Special attention will be paid to 
issues of institutional choice in this continuum. The real-world relevance of this 
continuum will be empirically confirmed by the results of a survey among several 
rural cooperatives in the Kiev Oblast of Ukraine. 
The property rights theory of hierarchical organizations
The property rights theory of the firm, mainly developed in the work of Grossman, 
Hart, and Moore (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) 
posits that it is too costly, and therefore impossible, to write comprehensive 
contracts. Contracts that are actually written are necessarily incomplete, in the 
sense that they contain gaps, missing provisions, and ambiguities. Ownership 
matters because it is a source of power in deciding on the uses of assets in 
situations not foreseen in the contracts. Contractual incompleteness impedes the 
efficient allocation of resources, and achieving efficiency depends on assigning 
property rights to contractual parties. Specifically, efficiency is defined in the 
property rights theory of the firm by the maximization of the net present value of 
relationship-specific investments, which are likely not to be undertaken if the 
potential investor fears being ‘held up’ by its contractual partner in view of 
contractual incompleteness. This fear, however, can be eliminated if the potential 
investor receives property rights to its contractual partner’s assets, or, more 
generally speaking, receives more extensive property rights than its partner. Thus, 
in a situation of contractual incompleteness, the efficient allocation of resources 
can be ensured if more extensive property rights are assigned to the contractual 
party that has a greater interest in transacting (i.e., whose potential investment has 
a higher net present value). 
For the present context, this theory can be taken to imply that the hierarchical 
relationship between contractual parties is defined by these parties’ having unequal 
property rights. The party with more extensive property rights thereby assumes the 
role of the superordinate, while the other party assumes that of the subordinate. 
Importantly, the property rights theory of the firm recognizes that hierarchical 
organization   involves   a   cost   in   terms   of   weakening   the   incentive   for   the 
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subordinate party to make its own relationship-specific investments, since the gains 
from investing will largely accrue to the superordinate party, as the latter has more 
extensive property rights. This account of hierarchical organization is coined in 
terms of analyzing the extent to which the distribution of property rights between 
contractual parties properly reflects the relative importance of these parties’ 
investment decisions, or in other words, the constellation of these parties’ interests 
in transacting. In the next section, the same logic will be utilized to rationalize the 
existence of market and cooperative organization by allowing for the appropriate 
variation in these interests. 
Toward a continuum view of market, hierarchical, and cooperative 
organization
The basic case analyzed by the property rights theory of the firm is that of one 
party having a more important investment decision (i.e., a greater interest in 
transacting) than the other party (e.g. Hart, 1995). In order to rationalize market 
and cooperative organization, this case can be modified in two ways. First, given 
the greater importance of one party’s investment decision, the importance of the 
second party’s investment decision may still vary in a certain range, which is 
delimited by the extreme positions of relative importance and total unimportance. 
The standard property rights theory of the firm does not explore the implications of 
this variation, but implicitly assumes the second party’s investment decision to be 
relatively important (though less important than is the case with the first party). 
Yet, once the second party’s investment decision is assumed to be close to 
unimportant, the rationale for hierarchical organization loses its validity. 
Indeed, consider two firms, A and B, the first of which organizes the 
production of certain products and for this purpose needs to buy inputs from the 
second one. Assume that these inputs are fungible and firm A can easily find 
alternative suppliers or substitute these inputs by other, similar inputs. In this case, 
firm A obviously has much more important investment decisions to make (with 
respect to the production in question) than firm B. Yet, given the fungibility of the 
inputs that need to be purchased by firm A, the appropriate governance structure 
for this purchasing transaction is represented by market rather than hierarchy, as 
could follows from a superficial application of the logic of the property rights 
theory of the firm. In fact, the argument of this theory, that the difference in 
relative importance of the parties’ investment decisions leads to the superior 
efficiency of hierarchical governance, applies only when the inputs are assumed 
not to be fungible, and firm A is assumed to be unable to easily switch to 
alternative suppliers (see Hart, 1995: 25–26). 
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The second way of modifying the situation of one party having a more 
important investment decision is to assume the equal importance of both parties’ 
investment decisions. Continuing the example of firms A and B, in this case both 
have equal interests in the corresponding transaction, and therefore will seek equal 
rights in this transaction’s governance. When equal participation in governance is 
required, neither market nor hierarchical governance are adequate, since they 
presuppose more decision-making power for firm A than for firm B. Indeed, if firm 
A purchases  inputs  from  firm B,  or acquires  firm  B itself (i.e., vertically 
integrates), firm B’s managers have little discretion over the organization of 
production in firm A (as well as the utilization of firm B’s outputs). Thus, if the 
interests of both firms in a particular transaction are essentially the same, both 
market and hierarchical governance would cause one party’s interests to be over-
represented at the expense of the other party’s interests. This over-representation 
manifests   itself  in  the  unequal  distribution  of decision-making  powers,  and 
consequently, the unequal distribution of any emerging rents. This would clearly 
reduce the disadvantaged party’s motivation to engage in this transaction. The 
governance mechanism that allows the necessary equal participation in decision–
making, and consequently, fair rent sharing, is represented by a cooperative or any 
other organization based on the uniform assignment of property rights to members.
The extended conceptual framework of the property rights theory of the firm 
thus permits defining the governance mechanisms of market, hierarchy, and 
cooperative organization in terms of the difference between the property rights 
assigned to contractual parties. Cooperative organization is thereby defined in 
terms of assigning equal property rights. Market and hierarchical organization, in 
contrast, are based on assigning unequal property rights, with the difference 
between them lying in the relative extensiveness of property rights assigned to the 
contractual party whose investment decision is less important. Specifically, these 
property rights can be designated as ‘insignificant’ for market organization and 
‘significant’ for hierarchy. Hence, the difference between property rights assigned 
to   contractual   parties   progressively   increases   from   cooperative   organization, 
through   hierarchy,   to   market   organization.   This   sequence   of   governance 
mechanisms thus represents a new governance continuum which is delimited by 
the polar modes of market and cooperative organization, and includes hierarchy ‘in 
between’.
Crucially, this new governance continuum differs from the standard continuum 
as developed by Williamson (1991) in that it does not consider market and 
hierarchy to be the ultimate forms of capitalistic economic organization, with all 
other organizational arrangements being defined in terms of various combinations 
of attributes of market and hierarchy. Hence, in the new continuum, cooperatives 
are not represented as hybrids between them; rather, they are independently 
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defined as embodiments of the equal assignment of property rights, with market 
and hierarchy being defined by various degrees of inequality in this assignment. At 
the same time, the new continuum does allow for the existence of hybrids in the 
sense of Williamson, i.e., as genuine mixtures between markets and hierarchies. In 
the new continuum, such genuine hybrids retain their traditional position between 
market and hierarchy, while the position of cooperatives is substantially different. 
Implications for institutional choice 
Any conceptualization of the governance continuum must address the issue of 
institutional choice, i.e., it must clarify the rules that determine which institutional 
alternatives are optimal in different transactional situations, as well as identify the 
consequences of not following these rules. In Williamson’s framework, the choice 
among market, hybrids, and hierarchy is determined by matching transactions, 
which differ in their attributes, with governance mechanisms, which differ in their 
costs and competencies (1996: 59). Imperfect matches between transactions and 
governance mechanisms are penalized by high transaction costs resulting from 
wrongly   chosen   governance   mechanisms.   However,   the   determinants   of 
institutional choice, as developed by Williamson (such as asset specificity), are 
more appropriate for understanding the choice among market, genuine hybrids, and 
hierarchy, than among market, hierarchy, and cooperative organization. 
Rather, following the logic of the property rights theory of the firm, the 
problem of institutional choice in the new continuum must lie in ensuring 
consistency between the relative importance of investment decisions of contractual 
parties and property rights assigned to them. Specifically, institutional choice in the 
new continuum can be defined as efficient if the party with a relatively important 
investment decision has privileged property rights, i.e., is either a buyer of inputs 
(if they are fungible) or an owner of the firm producing these inputs (if they are 
specific). The respective choices of cooperative organization would be efficient if 
the investment decision of both contractual parties is equally important. 
This  definition  of institutional   choice  efficiency   generates  a  number  of 
hypotheses for empirical research. The key hypothesis is that contractual parties 
will be satisfied with their property rights assignments if these assignments 
appropriately reflect the differences in their economic interests. Moreover, the 
structure of the new governance continuum allows for two possible types of 
mismatching property rights and economic interests, which will be designated in 
the present study as the dissipation effect and the crowding-out effect. The 
dissipation effect occurs when the property rights assigned to a party are more 
extensive than required for representing this party’s interest in transacting. This 
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party will then dissipate rents from transacting because it will be unable to make 
important investment decisions that belong to the other party. Empirically, the 
dissipation effect may take the form of a transaction that is governed in such a way 
that some parties to the transaction feel they cannot sufficiently enforce their 
interests. The crowding-out effect occurs when the property rights assigned to a 
party fall short of the extent of this party’s interest in transacting. In this case, the 
party will not undertake investments that it can potentially make because the 
constraints on its property rights will prevent it from fully appropriating any 
resulting gain. Empirically, this effect may manifest itself as a lack of motivation, 
for some parties to the transaction, to actually undertake that transaction. Any 
change in the assignment of property rights in the direction of increasing the 
satisfaction of transactional parties must involve the reduction of these two effects.
To be sure, the occurrence of these effects does not and is not intended to 
prove that cooperatives are not hybrid organizations. Yet these effects accentuate 
that the logic of cooperative organization does not consist of combining the 
attributes   of   market   and   hierarchy,   but   rather   of   providing   a   governance 
mechanism that appropriately reflects the equally important roles of all contractual 
parties in a given transactional relationship. Both market and hierarchy, which are 
based   on   the   unequal   assignment   of   property   rights,   necessarily   fail   to 
accommodate the situation when these roles are essentially equal, with this failure 
being manifested in the abovementioned crowding-out and dissipation effects. 
Hence, empirical confirmation of these effects, with the accompanying expression 
of dissatisfaction of the concerned contractual parties, can be regarded as indirect 
support for the validity of the logical foundations of the proposed continuum of 
market, hierarchical, and cooperative organization. 
The crowding-out and dissipation effects can be identified at each point of the 
governance   continuum   that   encompasses   market,   hierarchy,   and   cooperative 
organization if these governance mechanisms do not adequately reflect the genuine 
economic interests of contractual parties. Given the occurrence of the crowding-out 
effect,   the   continuum’s   logic   would   imply   that   the   economic   interests   of 
contractual parties that exhibit this effect would be better served if they had more 
extensive property rights. In a similar vein, identifying the dissipation effect 
implies that property rights assigned to contractual parties that dissipate rents from 
transacting have been more extensive than required by the relative importance of 
these parties’ investment decisions. 
Thus, identifying these effects indicates the existence of contractual parties 
whose relative property rights are out of balance with their relative economic 
interests. In this case, implications for optimal institutional choice depend on the 
type of governance mechanism at work in the status-quo. For example, given that a 
contractual party experiences the crowding-out effect, then optimally it must be 
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assigned more extensive property rights. This may take the form of a transition 
from market to hierarchy, or from hierarchy to cooperative organization, since both 
of these transitions are associated with enhancing the property rights of the less 
important contractual party in the status-quo. However, this may also take the form 
of transition from a cooperative to a hierarchical or market organization, thus 
allowing the concerned party to obtain superior property rights; that is, if the equal 
assignment of property rights does not mesh with the fact that this party’s 
economic interest in transacting is much greater than that of the other party.
Empirical investigation: the case of Ukrainian rural cooperatives
This section presents the results from empirical investigation into the crowding-out 
and dissipation effects, which was carried out on a number of Ukrainian rural 
cooperatives. These cooperatives were created by rural dwellers after 1991 to fill 
the increasing gap in the provision of services related to maintaining social 
infrastructure in rural areas (e.g. childcare, medical service, gas and electricity 
supply, territory cleaning and greening, funeral services, etc). During the socialist 
period, these services were provided by local large-scale agricultural enterprises 
which were entrusted and subsidized by the government to do so. Understandably, 
since the beginning of Ukrainian independence, managers of local agricultural 
enterprises have been increasingly unwilling and unable to finance and deliver 
local rural development activities. On the other hand, whereas the agricultural 
enterprises’ role in rural development had to be transferred to local governments, 
this transfer was hindered by the local governments’ shortage of funds and 
administrative capabilities to adopt new responsibilities. As a result, the quality of 
rural life and the state of rural infrastructure in Ukraine has, since 1991, been 
progressively deteriorating (World Bank, 2004).
The failure of both large-scale agricultural enterprises and local governments 
to provide satisfactory solutions to rural problems has rendered rural dwellers 
themselves responsible for maintaining their villages’ social infrastructure through 
the creation of rural cooperatives. These cooperatives have not, however, become 
widespread in Ukraine and most other post-Soviet countries, where agricultural 
and rural cooperation still carries negative connotations of collective farming 
associated with the socialist period (Gardner and Lerman, 2006). Yet, it is 
important to note that these cooperatives did not emerge in the process of the 
reorganization of former collective or state farms; rather they represent genuine 
grassroots organizations aiming to maintain social infrastructure on the mutual 
self-help basis. In Ukraine, these cooperatives appeared in those Oblasts where 
their creation was supported by local agricultural advisory services (which in turn 
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were partially supported by foreign donors), most importantly in the Oblasts of 
Kiev, Odessa, and Donetsk. Whether the active involvement of advisory services 
caused a certain distortion of the bottom-up nature of these cooperatives may be 
subject to dispute; yet it is beyond doubt that these cooperatives are not top-down 
entities, and their creation has not been affected by any administrative pressures. 
From the viewpoint of the continuum of market, hierarchical, and cooperative 
organization,   as   proposed   in   the   preceding   sections,   the   creation   of   these 
cooperatives has been warranted by the fact that most rural dwellers had similar 
interests in the services these cooperatives provided. Put differently, no rural 
dweller was substantially more interested in these services than any other. The 
homogeneity   of   the   dwellers’   interests   clearly   indicates   the   optimality   of 
cooperative, rather than market or hierarchical organization. Yet this homogeneity 
did not mean that all dwellers preferred identical patterns of provision of specific 
services. Given the equal assignment of property rights envisaged by cooperative 
organization, these minor differences in interests gave rise to the emergence of the 
crowding-out and dissipation effects, thereby revealing the partial dissatisfaction of 
some cooperative members with their rural cooperatives. Thus, the operation of 
these cooperatives provides a chance to test the hypothetical relationships between 
the satisfaction of contractual parties and their experience with the dissipation and 
crowding-out effects. 
The required data were obtained from a survey of 197 members of 13 rural 
cooperatives in the Kiev Oblast of Ukraine (which encompassed all members of all 
cooperatives of this type in this Oblast). The survey was conducted in March 2006 
by the Kiev Oblast Agricultural Advisory Service, which was closely involved in 
the process of creating these cooperatives, and which provided information about 
their operation. The occurrence of the dissipation effect was measured by asking 
the cooperative members to characterize the process of making strategic decisions 
in their cooperatives as being more hierarchical or more consensual. Since this 
question aims to reveal whether cooperative members feel as if they cannot 
appropriately enforce their interests, answers to this question indicate the extent to 
which the property rights of some cooperative members are perceived (by other 
members) as being in excess of the respective economic interests. The occurrence 
of the crowding-out effect was measured by asking cooperative members about the 
extent of their engagement in planning their cooperatives’ activities. Since the 
extent of engagement is determined by one’s motivation for doing so, low 
engagement must indicate the presence of the crowding-out effect. Table 1 shows 
the questions that were used to measure the crowding-out and dissipation effects in 
more detail. 
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Table 1. Variables, survey questions, and answer categories





usefulness of your 
cooperative to you.”
0: My cooperative is not particularly helpful 
for pursuing my interests.
1: To some extent, my cooperative helps me 
with pursuing my interests.
2: I can effectively pursue my interests 
through my cooperative.
Dissipation effect “Characterize the 
process of making 
strategic decisions in 
your cooperative.”
0: The process is enuinely hierarchical; there 
is no consensus at all.
1: The process is more hierarchical than 
consensual.
2: The process is mainly consensual, but 
sometimes these decisions are made 
hierarchically.
3: The procgess is genuinely consensual.
The lower the category’s number the more 




engagement in your 
cooperative.”
0: I am never involved in planning the 
activities of my cooperative.
1: I am seldom involved in planning the 
activities.
2: From time to time, I am involved in 
planning the activities.
3: I am actively involved in planning.
The lower the category’s number the more 
pronounced is the crowding-out effect.
In general, descriptive statistics shows that the cooperative members in the sample 
are satisfied with their cooperatives. The process of decision-making is perceived 
as consensual and the members see themselves as being involved in planning their 
cooperatives’ activities. Hence, the dissipation and crowding-out effects do not 
play an important role. More specifically, the members’ opinion about their 
cooperatives can be characterized as follows (for a summary, see Table 2):
·Satisfaction: 103 cooperative members indicated that they can effectively 
pursue their interests through their cooperatives, 85 said that the cooperative 
helps them to some extent in pursuing their interests, and only 8 found the 
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cooperative not particularly helpful. One respondent did not answer this 
question.
·Dissipation effect: 108 respondents characterized the process of decision-
making in their cooperatives as genuinely consensual, 79 said that it is mainly 
consensual, 9 saw it as more hierarchical than consensual, and only 1 
perceived it as genuinely hierarchical.
·Crowding-out effect: 114 cooperative members described themselves as 
actively involved in planning their cooperatives’ activities, 67 as being 
involved from time to time, and 16 as seldom involved. No cooperative 
member responded that they were never involved in planning these activities.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics





Members' satisfaction: N=196 100%
My cooperative is not particularly helpful for 
pursuing my interests.
8 4.1%
To some extent, my cooperative helps me with 
pursuing my interests.
85 43.4%
I can effectively pursue my interests through 
my cooperative.
103 52.6%
Dissipation effect: N=197 100%
The process is genuinely hierarchical; there is 
no consensus at all.
1 0.5%
The process is more hierarchical than 
consensual.
9 4.6%
The process is mainly consensual, but 
sometimes these decisions are made 
hierarchically.
79 40.1%
The process is genuinely consensual. 108 54.8%
Crowding-out effect: N=197 100%
I am never involved in planning the activities 
of my cooperative.
0 0.0%
I am seldom involved in planning the 
activities.
16 8.1%
From time to time, I am involved in planning 
the activities.
67 34.0%
I am actively involved in planning. 114 57.9%
Source: Data from own survey.
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The hypothesis that the dissipation and crowding-out effects negatively affect 
members’ satisfaction was tested by correlation analysis. Because the variables are 
ordinal-scaled, Kendall's tau is used as a correlation measure. Table 3 shows the 
results.







Dissipation effect 196 0.329 0.000
Crowding-out effect 196 0.226 0.001
Remarks:
*  Kendall's tau used as correlation measure.
** A significance level of less than 0.05 shows significant correlation between the 
    two variables.
Source:     Data from own survey.
The   statistical   results   reveal   that   the   dissipation   and   crowding-out   effects 
significantly   influence   members’   satisfaction.   The   positive   signs   for   both 
correlation coefficients show that the more pronounced both these effects are, the 
lower is the satisfaction level of the cooperative members. Thus, the empirical 
results confirm the hypothesized theoretical relationships between the crowding-
out effect, the dissipation effect, and member satisfaction. 
Conclusions
This paper has argued that designating cooperatives as hybrid organizations must 
be based on the precise definition of the way they combine the characteristics of 
market and hierarchy, while in fact it is easier to show that they reject, rather than 
combine these characteristics. Indeed, extending the property rights theory of the 
firm to include rationalizing market and cooperative organization has demonstrated 
that market and hierarchical organization have a crucial commonality that is not 
shared by cooperatives. Specifically, both market and hierarchy are based on the 
unequal assignment of property rights in a specific transaction among contractual 
parties,   while   cooperative   organization   is   defined   by   the   equality   of   this 
assignment.   Since   the   difference   between   the   property   rights   assigned   to 
contractual parties progressively increases from cooperative organization through 
hierarchy to market, it can serve as the logical foundation for an alternative 
representation of the governance continuum. While the standard version of this 
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continuum is delimited by the polar modes of market and hierarchy, the polar 
modes of its proposed version are market and cooperative organization, with 
hierarchy lying ‘in between’. 
The broader implication of this argument is that defining the hybridity of 
governance mechanisms depends on the way the governance continuum is defined, 
which can be done in a variety of ways. Hence, any interpretation of hybridity must 
be traced to the underlying definition of the governance continuum. At the same 
time, exploring the multiple ways that governance mechanisms can be compared to 
each other and organized in the continuum form is crucially important for 
understanding the determinants of institutional diversity. 
In particular, the proposed version of the governance continuum can explain 
the emergence of new organizational models of cooperatives (Chaddad and Cook, 
2004) as attempts to bring the members’ property rights in line with their changing 
economic interests; these interests may become increasingly heterogeneous, yet not 
sufficiently so to justify transferring to hierarchical or market organization. 
Evidently, the Chaddad and Cook (2004) typology of cooperative organizational 
models, which stretches from traditional cooperatives to investor-oriented firms, 
fits well with the proposed continuum, which consecutively encompasses market, 
hierarchical, and cooperative organization. However, it is difficult to integrate into 
the standard continuum delimited by market and hierarchy. Generally, identifying 
new criteria for defining the governance continuum helps to reveal new aspects of 
the economic rationale for the concerned governance mechanisms and must 
therefore be an integral part of institutional economics research. 
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